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INTRODUCTION
Thomas Beatie became the subject of national attention after an-
nouncing in The Advocate that he was pregnant' and after being
interviewed on national television by both Oprah Winfrey' and Barbara
Walters.' Beatie became known as the first man to give birth to a baby'
* Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. Jeni Christensen, Trans Positions, ADVOCATE: NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN NEWSMAGAZINE
32, May 20, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 11187018 ("Thomas Beatie first told
the world that he was pregnant in The Advocate in March").
2. See ABC Good Morning America (ABC television broadcast July 23, 2008), available
at 2008 WLNR 13746105. Thomas Beatie first made headlines five months ago
when news of his pregnancy first became public. Born Tracy Lagondino, he began his
transition at 24, taking testosterone and having his breasts surgically removed, but
still hoping to one day have a child, Thomas kept his female reproductive organs. Af-
ter meeting wife Nancy who couldn't conceive, the couple decided to inseminate
Thomas with donor sperm. Since then, the Bearies have faced a whirlwind of criti-
cism for their decision, criticism they addressed with Oprah Winfrey.
3. See ABC News Now Special Report (ABC television broadcast Dec. 12, 2008), avail-
able at 2008 WLNR 23413877.
4. Ellen Goodman, Daddy becomes a mother, father, TULSA WORLD, July 12, 2008, at
A17, available at 2008 WLNR 13125209 ("For those of you who do not watch
Oprah or read tabloids, Beatie is 'The World's First Pregnant Man.'").
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and has since given birth to a second child! He and his wife and chil-
dren live in Oregon.6
Transgendered individuals and their families face legal risks that
most families do not, at least in part, because state laws are often unclear
about whether or under what conditions transgendered individuals are
permitted to marry the individuals whom they love. Challenges to the
validity of marriages involving the transgendered may arise under a vari-
ety of circumstances, ranging from cases in which individuals may have
hidden or may not even have known that they were transgendered until
after their marriages, to cases in which the individuals had already tran-
sitioned and had explained their personal histories to their partners
before they were married. Where such marriages are contested, a num-
ber of issues may have to be resolved including the validity of the
marriage, parental status, and who should have custody of or visitation
with any of the children raised by the parties.
This Article focuses on the spousal and parent-child relationships of
transgendered individuals. Regrettably, much of the law is still unclear.
While most states specifyr the conditions under which a transgendered
individual can have his or her birth certificate modified to reflect his or
her self-identified sex, states have been much less clear about how local
marriage laws apply to transgendered individuals. In many states, there
is no express policy with respect to whether a transgendered person will
only be permitted to marry someone of the opposite sex of his or her
self-identified sex or, instead, someone of the opposite sex of his or her
birth sex. Current law in most states is intolerable, either because it fails
to take into account the actual lives of the transgendered, or because it is
simply indeterminate.
1. ON BIRTH CERTIFICATES AND QUALIFICATIONS FOR MARRIAGE
Almost all states permit a transgendered individual to have his or
her birth certificate changed, as long as certain conditions have been
met. However, there are at least two reasons why the general willingness
of states to permit birth certificate modifications does not settle issues
related to familial status. First, states vary with respect to what is re-
5. Baby No. 2 born to 'man, HERALD-SUN (Melbourne), June 12, 2009, at 29, available
at 2009 WLNR 11167537 ("Thomas Bearie, the world's first pregnant man, has
given birth to his second child.").
6. Kristi Turnquist, Oh, what a glitzy year we had!' PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Dec. 30,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 24991737 ("Bearie and his wife, Nancy, of Bend,
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quired in order for a birth certificate to be changed, which means that
what one state requires for modification might not suffice in a different
state. Second, even where a modification has been permitted, the state
may only recognize the modified birth certificate as establishing the in-
dividual's sex for certain legal purposes-a transgendered individual
might be considered male for purposes of identification on a birth cer-
tificate or driver's license but be considered female for purposes of
determining the sex of potential marriage partners. To add insult to in-
jury, the state's policy with respect to family relationships may not be
established by statute and may instead have to be established in the
courts in the context of an individual case, which creates the potential
for harm to both adults and children and may make planning difficult if
not impossible for those individuals wishing to do what is best for their
families.
A. Modijy5ing Birth Certificates
Currently, only Ohio, Idaho, and Tennessee do not permit trans-
gendered individuals to change their birth certificates to reflect their
self-identified sex.7 Other states permit changes as long as certain medi-
cal procedures have taken place," although there is no agreement about
which procedures are required in order for such changes to be made.'
This raises the distinct possibility that transgendered individuals who
had undergone certain surgical procedures would qualify for birth
7. Briana Lynn Morgan, Note, The Use of Rules and Standards to Define a Transsexual's
Sex for the Pu rpose ofMarriage: A n A rgument for a Hybrid App roach, 5 5 HAST INGS L.J.
1329, 1336 (2004) ("All states but three-Idaho, Tennessee, and Ohio-allow trans-
sexuals to change their sex on their birth certificates.")
8. Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGs L.J. 731, 768 (2008) ("Every state
allowing change of sex on a birth certificate requires evidence of surgery to warrant a
gender reclassification, though they vary in what proof is required and in the specific-
ity of the evidentiary requirements."); Alice Newlin, Should a Trip from Illinois to
Tennessee Change a Woman into a Man?: Proposal for a Uniform Interstate Sex Reas-
signment Recognition Act, 17 COLIIM. J. GENDER & L. 461, 481 (2008) ("Of the
twenty-five jurisdictions to enact statutes allowing transgender people to modify birth
records, all but a handful require proof that the individual seeking modification has
undergone some form of sex reassignment surgery.").
9. Shana Brown, Sex Changes and "Opposite-Sex" Marriage: Applying the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to Compel Interstate Recognition of Transgendered Persons 'A mended Legazl
Sex for Marital Purposes, 38 SAN DIEGO L. Ray. 1113, 1129 (200 1) ("The circum-
stanices under which transsexuals and intersexuals may legally change the sex
designated on their birth certificates vary from state to state.").
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certificate modifications in some jurisdictions but not others.'0 Indeed,
the requirements within the state of New York differ depending upon
where one lives, and a particular procedure that would suffice in one
part of the state for purposes of meeting the birth certificate modifica-
tion requirement would not suffice in another."
That an individual would qualifyr for a birth certificate modifica-
tion in one jurisdiction but not in another is troubling for a few
different reasons. First, given all of the difficulties that can arise in our
current terror-conscious society for someone whose physical appearance
is not in accord with that person's official sex, precluding individuals
from having their documents reflect their appearance and self-identified
sex seems cruel.'12 Second, it is hard to understand what asserted state
interests could justify the differing treatments that individuals receive
depending upon where they happen to have been born-an individual
born in one jurisdiction is permitted to have his or her birth certificate
changed, but an individual born in a different jurisdiction is not, even
though both individuals have undergone identical surgical procedures.
One response to this confusing state of affairs is simply to assert
that this is a price of being in a federal system where different states
10. See Spade, supra note 8, at 736 (noting that New York and California have differing
standards).
11. Id. at 769-70. As a result of the conflicting standards, two similarly situated trans-
gender people, who had both undergone the same gender-confirming surgery (such a
two transgender women who have undergone penectomy, and no other procedures,
or two rransgender men who have undergone phalloplasty, and no other procedures)
would have different results seeking gender reclassification on their birth certificates if
one person was born in Westchester and the other was born in Queens. The trans-
gender woman born in New York City would be denied a new birth certificate. The
transgender man born in New York City would be granted one. The transgender
woman born in Westchester would be granted a new birth certificate, but the trans-
gender man would be denied.
12. See Nancy J. Knauer, Gender Marers: Making the Case for Trans Inclusion, 6 PIERCE
L. Ray. 1, 47-48 (2007) (citations omitted). Air travel is an excellent example of a
normal everyday activity that can produce considerable stress and discomfort for
transgender individuals. Although we may gripe and complain about long lines and
the futility of putting our toothpaste in a dlear Ziploc bag, the general public has
largely accepted the enhanced security measures as part and parcel of post-September
Eleventh reality. However, for transgender individuals, these new security measures
have made air travel a complicated and, at times, perilous proposition. Transgender
advocates have prepared advice sheets for rransgender individuals who are planning to
fly and recommend that transgender individuals report to the airport well in advance
of a flight in order to leave sufficient time for all the questions to be answered and
addressed. A transgersder individual whose gender expression and/or embodiment
does not match her/his identity documents will be subject to increased scrutiny and
questioning. Even transgender individuals whose identity documents are congruent
may find the more intrusive physical screening threatening and invasive.
60 ol. 17:57
weigh the competing interests differently and thus arrive at differing
judgments with respect to the conditions, if any, under which a birth
certificate modification is permissible. Yet, the "reasonable legislatures
can disagree" approach is rather dissatisfying, given the burdens that are
placed on transgendered individuals in those states where it is difficult
or impossible to have their birth certificates changed.
Whether or not there is a constitutional right to have one's birth
certificate reflect one's self-identified sex,"3 something should be done
legislatively to make that possible, either through a uniform act" or
through an act of Congress. There are at least two related but distinct
issues that should be addressed in such legislation: (1) the ability of an
individual to have his or her birth certificate changed to reflect his or
her physical and psychological self in a particular jurisdiction, and (2)
the assurance that a birth certificate, modified in one state, will be rec-
ognized as accurately reflecting the person's sex when he or she travels
through or moves to another state.
The existence of a great disparity among the states with respect to
the conditions under which they will permit birth certificate modifica-
tions poses two related challenges in this area. First, depending upon the
strength of the implicated interests, states might be relatively unwilling
to adopt a uniform law that would either (1) make it easier for those
born in the state to change their birth certificates, or (2) commit those
states to recognizing modifications to birth certificates from other states
that could not be obtained locally.'" But this would mean that there
would still be a great disparity among the states even were a uniform law
proposed, unless added incentives were offered for states to adopt that
law.'
6
Perhaps, then, the better course of action would be to have Con-
gress require that full faith and credit be given to a stare's modified birth
13. See Newlin, supra note 8, at 465 (citation omitted). While at this time there is no
recognized constitutional right to change one's legal sex, the lack of an organized sys-
tem to recognize sex reassignment in the United States has created an
unconstitutional deprivation for transgender people. Sex has always been a major fac-
tor in assigning rights and privileges to an individual, and uncertainty as to legal sex
creates uncertainty as to sex-linked rights.
14. See generally Newlin, supra note 8 (proposing a Uniform Interstate Sex Reassignment
Recognition Act).
15. By the same token, a state might refuse to credit a record from another state because
doing so would violate an important public policy of the state. See Mark Strasser,
Marriage, Transsexuals, and the Meaning of Sex: On DOMA Full Faith and Credit,
and Statutory Interpretation, 3 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 301, 315 (2003).
16. Cf Robert Brown, Note, Exotic Pets Invade United States Ecosystems: Legislative Fail-
ure and a Proposed Solution, 81 IND. L.J. 713, 727 (2006) ("Congress may use the
broad scope of its spending power to entice the States to adopt uniform laws.").
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certificate. After all, Article WV of the Constitution specifically authorizes
Congress to set the conditions under which a record from one state
must be credited by another. 17However, there may be reason to be cau-
tious about having the federal government specify the conditions under
which modifications to birth certificates should be credited, since it
turns out that some conditions that would suffice for a birth certificate
modification under state law would not suffice under the regulations set
by the Social Security Administration,"8 and that most transgendered
individuals do not undergo the surgery required by the Social Security
Administration. 19
The difficulty pointed to here is that the congressional full faith
and credit measure might not simply say that any birth certificate modi-
fied in one state would have to be given full faith and credit in another,
but might instead say that modifications granted in light of certain
specified requirements, e.g., those used by the Social Security Admini-
stration, would be entitled to full faith and credit. Such a statue would
be regrettable for two very different reasons: (1) it would mean that
some but not other birth certificate modifications would be entitled to
full faith and credit, and some individuals who had crossed state lines
still would not know their sex for legal purposes 20 and (2) states might
well tailor their own requirements for birth certificate modifications to
reflect the federal ones if only to assure that their own birth certificate
modifications would receive full faith and credit in other states. But this
might mean that states would make it too difficult for individuals to
have their birth certificates changed. Professor Spade discusses the
cccommon misunderstanding . .. that all transgender people undergo
genital surgery (phalloplasty or vaginoplasy-the creation of a penis or
vagina) as the primary medical treatment for changing gender, 2 ' noting
that "the majority of transgender people do not undergo surgeries"12 fo r
a variety of reasons including expense and its being contra-indicated
17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.").
18. See Spade, stupra note 8, at 762 ("genital surgery is required to change gender with
SSA").
19. See id. ("most transgender people do not undergo genital surgery").
20. See Brown, supra note 9, at 1116 ("Many transgendered individuals must guess as to
their legal gender because an intersexual or transsexual can be legally categorized as a
woman in one state, but a man in another.").
21. See Spade, supra note 8, at 754.
22. Id.
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medically.23 Were a uniform standard imposed by Congress, it is not at
all clear that the standard chosen would meet the needs of the rransgen-
dered community.
B. Birth Certificates and Marriage
One issue is whether or not state law will permit an individual to
have a birth certificate modified to reflect his or her current gender. A
separate issue is the effect of such a change, e.g., for marriage purposes.
In In re Ladrach , an Ohio court explained that it seemed obvious
that "if a state permits such a change of sex on the birth certificate of a
post-operative transsexual, either by statute or administrative ruling,
then a marriage license, if requested, must issue to such a person pro-
vided all other statutory requirements are fulfilled. 2 ' The court refused
to order that a marriage license be issued to Elaine Ladrach, because
Ladrach's birth certificate indicated that Ladrach was male,2 notwith-
standing that she had already undergone sex reassignment surgery2.
Suppose, however, that an individual did have an amended birth
certificate indicating that the person's sex had changed. One would infer
from Ladrach that such a person should be permitted to marry someone
of his or her birth sex, i.e., someone who was not of the individual's
23. Id. at 755.
24. 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
25. Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 831; but see In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 85 (Md. 2003) (refuts-
ing to "opine on what the collateral effect of any judgment attesting to a change in gender
might be") (italics in original). The Maryland court explained that
the issue of a transsexual's true gender can arise in many different contexts
and have a wide variety of collateral consequences [citing Goodwin v.
United Kingdom, [2002] 2 FCR 577, 67 13MLR 199 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Grand Chamber) 2002)]. It may affect or determine, for example, the va-
lidity of a marriage, whether a birth certificate may be amended,
entitlement to pension or insurance rights that distinguish by gender,
whether distinctions in employment are, as to a particular individual, per-
missible ot unlawful, application of the law of rape or other offenses in
which gender may be an element or issue, medical treatment and housing
assignment upon incarceration or other institutional confinement, entitle-
ment to participate in certain amateur ot professional sports and housing
and work assignments available for persons in military service.
See Heilig, 816 A. 2d at 85, n.9 (citing Richards v. United States Tennis ALSS'n., 400
N.Y.S.2d 267 (1977)).
26. See Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 829 (birth certificate indicated that Ladrach was male
and Ohio prohibited same-sex marriage).
27. See Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 830 (discussing "the recent medical surgical procedure
that resulted in the removal of the penis and testicles and the creation of a vagina").
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current sex. At issue in another Ohio case, In re Marriage License for
Nash, 2 8 was an appeal by Jacob B. Nash and Erin A. Barr who were chal-
lenging a denial of their application for a marriage license .2 1 )While Nash
had been born a femnale,30 he had undergone gender reassignment sur-
gery and had had his birth certificate amended in light of Massachusetts
law."1 Surgery notwithstanding, the court rejected that the amended
birth certificate accurately reflected Nash's sex, instead finding that the
32
original birth certificate was the more accurate representation.
Ohio takes the position that transgendered individuals born in
Ohio cannot have their birth certificates changed, even if those indi-
viduals have undergone sex reassignment surgery. In addition, Ohio
refuses to recognize amended birth certificates, at least for purposes of
its marriage laws. Here, the state seems to be offering a consistent view,
although a separate question is whether that consistent view can be justi-
fied by legitimate state interests."3
Other states have adopted inconsistent policies in that they may
treat a transgendered individual as belonging to one sex for certain pur-
poses and the other sex for different purposes. Consider Texas, which
permits birth certificates to be changed under certain conditions." In
Litteton v. Prange,"5 a Texas Court of Appeals rejected that an amended
birth certificate represented Christie Littleton's true sex,316 notwithstand-
ing that Christie had undergone sex reassignment surgery at the




When explaining why the amended birth certificate should not be
thought to represent Christie's sex, the Texas court reasoned that the
legislature had intended to permit the correction of inaccurate birth cer-
28. In re Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 'WXL
23097095 (Ohio App. Dec. 31, 2003).
29. See Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *I.
30. Nash, 2003 WL 23097095, at *1.
31. Nash, 2003 'WE 23097095, at '1.
32. Nash, 2003 'WE 23097095, at *5 ("In this case, the amended birth certificate submit-
ted by Nash as evidence of his sex was rebutted by the evidence already in possession
of the trial court, to wit, Nash's original birth certificate designating Nash's sex as fe-
male.").
33. The state justifies its position by appealing to the "clear Ohio public policy against
same-sex marriages." See Nash, 2003 WE 23097095, at *9. But the state has neither
articulated persuasive reasons to jusify, its same-sex marriage prohibition nor persua-
sive reasons to justif~y treating marriages involving transsexuals as falling within the
category of same-sex marriages.
34. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 192.011.
35. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
36. Litteton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
37. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224.
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tificates only in those cases in which the inaccuracy had been at "the
time the certificate was recorded. 38 This meant that Christie was a man,
notwithstanding her having a vagina and labia and not a penis, scrotum,
and testicles .3 ' The court recognized that Christie had made "every con-
ceivable effort to make herself a femnale,"40 and that some doctors would
consider Christie female 4 ' but nonetheless reasoned that the "body that
Christie inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than what the physi-
cians have supplied, 4 ' and thus Christie must be considered male for
matrimonial purposes. That meant that her seven-year marriage to Jona-
than Mark Littleton was a marriage between two males,4 which Texas
would not recognize. Christie was thus precluded from bringing a
44
wrongful death action as Mark Littleton's surviving spouse, which
made it unnecessary for the lower court to reach the merits with respect
to whether medical malpractice had caused the death of Christie's not-
legally-recognized husband.
Another case involved a challenge to the validity of a marriage after
one of the parties to the marriage had died. In In re Estate of Gardiner,
the Kansas Supreme Court was asked to determine the validity of a mar-
riage between J'Noel Ball and Marshall Gardiner.4 J'Noel had
undergone sex reassignment surgery and then had had her birth certifi-
cate amended in accord with Wisconsin law.4 She and Marshall were
married in Kansas.
38. Litteton, 9 S.W.3d at 231. Cf K. v. Health Division, Dept. of Human Resources,
560 P.2d 1070, 1072 (or. 1977).
In our opinion, it is at least equally, if not more reasonable, to assume that in
enacting these statutes it was the intent of the legislature of Oregon that a 'birth cer-
tificate' is an historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth, subject
to the specific exceptions provided by statute.
The Oregon Legislature subsequently passed legislation authorizing amend-
ments to birth certificates under appropriate conditions. See OR. REV. STAT.
§432.235(4) (West 2009).
Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction
indicating that the sex of an individual born in this state has been changed by surgical
procedure and whether such individual's name has been changed, the certificate of
birth of such individual shall be amended as prescribed by rule of the state registrar.
39. See Litteton, 9 S.W.3d at 224.
40. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 2303 31.
41. See Littleton, 9 S.W. 3d at 23 1.
42. Litteton, 9 S.W.3d at 23 1.
43. Litteton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
44. Litteton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
45. In re Est. of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
46. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 12 1-22.
47. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 122.
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One of the implicated issues was whether Kansas should give the
Wisconsin amended birth certificate full faith and credit." A point mer-
iting emphasis is that Kansas permits birth certificates to be amended
under certain conditions,"9 and a state permitting birth certificate modi-
fications cannot plausibly say that crediting a birth certificate
modification from another state violates public policy if that same
modification could have been obtained locally by someone born in the
state. Thus, even if an amended birth certificate need not be given full
faith and credit by a state that refuses to permit such modifications, a
separate question is whether a state that permits such modifications can
somehow nonetheless claim that it has a strong public policy that would
be violated by recognizing the other state's amended birth certificate."0
While it might have been credible for Ohio to have claimed that recog-
nizing a Wisconsin amended birth certificate would violate local public
policy, it was not credible for Kansas to make such a claim."1
Nor would it have been credible to argue that the procedures un-
dergone by J'Noel were insufficient as a matter of law to qualify for an
amendment to her birth certificate, since J'Noel had "undergone elec-
trolysis, thermolysis, tracheal shave, hormone injections, extensive
counseling, and reassignment surgery."512 The Gardiner court did not
suggest that some additional procedures would have made the differ-
ence, but instead concluded that even after all of the procedures "J'Noel
remains a transsexual, and a male for purposes of marriage."
The Kansas Supreme Court seemed to recognize one of the impli-
cations of its decision, namely, that J'Noel would be permitted to marry
a woman under Kansas law, although the court mentioned this possibil-
ity in an offhand remark when analyzing the position offered by Joe
Gardiner, the estranged son of the deceased, 4 who was challenging the
validity of J'Noel's marriage. The Gardiner court noted,
48. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 123-24.
49. KAN ADMIN. REGS. § 27-17-20(b)(1)(A)(i) (2009).
50. See Strasser, supra note 15, at 316. Kansas should be quite willing to credit an
amendment to a birth certificate in another state if the amendment would have been
permitted locally under those same conditions, since one then could hardly claim that
legal recognition of the amended birth certificate would somehow undermine anim
portant Kansas public policy.
51. However, since the Gardiner decision, it may no longer be possible to get such a
change of birth certificate in Kansas. See Somers v. Superior Court, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d
116, 118 (Cal. App. 2009) ("In 2006, plaintiff sought advice from two Kansas attor-
neys regarding changing her birth certificate. Both advised her that Kansas law does
not permit issuance of a new birth certificate to reflect a change of gender.").
52. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 137.
53. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 137.
54. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 122.
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Applying the statute as Joe advocates, a male-to-female trans-
sexual whose sexual preference is for women may marry a
woman within the advocated reading of K.S.A.200 1 Supp. 23-
101 because, at the time of birth, one marriage partner was
male and one was female. Thus, in spite of the outward ap-
pearance of femaleness in both marriage partners at the time
of the marriage, it would not be a void marriage under the ad-
vocated reading of K.S.A.2001 Supp. 23-101."
Yet, the state of Kansas had announced a strong public policy that
only permitted the recognition of marriages between a man and a
woman.516 One might have inferred that the reading advocated by Joe
Gardiner would have been rejected, because it meant that the state
would be recognizing a same-sex marriage, announced policy to the con-
trary notwithstanding. After all, regardless of how a transsexual appears
at birth, someone like J'Noel who had undergone a whole array of pro-
cedures would seem much more plausibly characterized as a woman
than as a man."7 However, appearances notwithstanding, the Kansas Su-
preme Court's holding that J'Noel was a man for marriage purposes"
meant that J'Noel's marriage to a woman would have been valid under
Kansas law.
Littleton and Gardiner are in stark contrast to M T v. J V, 9 in
which a New Jersey appellate court upheld the validity of a marriage
between a man and a male-to-female transsexual who had undergone sex
reassignment surgery. 60In some respects, the facts were quite favorable
for the plaintiff in M T in that, for example, M.T. had not only under-
gone sex reassignment surgery, but also the defendant had paid for it.,
J.T could hardly have claimed, for example, that he had been defrauded
by M.T. and that he had never realized that he was marrying someone
55. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 126.
56. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136.
57. Cf Phyllis Randolph Frye & Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have
Existed Legally in the United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REv. 103 1,
1033 (2001). For example, on September 16, 2000, Ms. Jessica Wicks and Ms.
Robin Manhart Wicks were legally married in San Antonio, Texas. Jessica's original
birth certificate read 'boy' and Robin's original birth certificate read 'female.' These
women shared vows, exchanged rings, and were blessed by a Minister of God in a
private ceremony before about fifty friends and supporters.
58. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 137.
59. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
60. See MT, 355 A.2d at 211 ("the court below correctly determined that plaintiff at the
time of her marriage was a female and that defendant, a man, became her lawful hus-
band, obligated to support her as his wife.").
61. SeeM T, 35 5 A.2d at 205.
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who was transgendered. Yet, there had been no fraud in Littleton or
Gardiner-in both cases, the marriage had taken place after full disclo-
62sure of transsexual status .
Suppose that we consider a much different kind of case where there
is ample evidence that the individual seeking an annulment of the mar-
riage claims to have been defrauded because he had never been informed
that his wife was transgendered . In this kind of case, i.e., one in which
the validity of the marriage is being challenged on the basis of fraud
rather than on whether a marriage between a man and a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual will ever be recognized, the legal analysis
would be much different from the kind offered by the Gardiner and
Littleton courts. The question at hand would not be whether the state as
a general matter will recognize a marriage between someone who is
transgendered and someone who is not of that individual's self-identified
sex. Rather, the validity of such marriages would be accepted as a general
matter and the question, instead, would be whether the state would rec-
ognize the marriage on these particular facts.
A few points might be made about cases in which one of the parties
was allegedly defrauded and seeks to have the marriage annulled. As a
general matter, a claim of fraud cannot be brought successfully to annul
a marriage unless the fraud concerns something essential to the mar-
riage.6i While states vary with respect to what qualifies as essential to
61marriage, most states interpret this requirement to involve matters re-
62. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. App. 1999). ("In her affidavit,
Christie states that Jonathon was fully aware of her background and the fact that she
had undergone sex reassignment surgery."). While this issue was not addressed in the
Kansas Supreme Court decision, it was addressed in the Kansas Court of Appeals de-
cision. See Gardiner, 22 P.3d at]1091 ("J'Noel further asserted that she told Marshall
about the sex reassignment surgery she had undergone before the marriage.").
63. In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971), the plaintiff had married
the defendant without knowing that his spouse was transgendered. See id. at 499. On
February 22nd the parties took part in a marriage ceremony in Belton, Texas. They
returned to the plaintiffs apartment. Being intoxicated, the plaintiff went to sleep.
He awoke at 2 o'clock in the morning, reached for the defendant and upon touching
the defendant, discovered that the defendant had male sexual organs. He immediately
left the bed, 'got drunk some more' and went to the bus station.
64. See Leax v. Leax, No. 01-08-00149-CV, 2009 WL 1635199, at *5 (Tex. App. June
11, 2009) ("American courts generally have held that marriages can be annulled on
the basis of fraud only if the fraud concerns an issue essential to the marriage.").
65. See Woronzoff-Daschkoff v. Woronzoff-Daschkoff, 104 N.E.2d 877, 880 (N.Y.
1952) "[While we have, for better or worse, retreated from the old idea that mar-
riages can be voided only for frauds going to the essentials of marriage, that is,
consortium and cohabitation, it is, nonetheless, still the law in New York that an-
nulments are decreed, not for any and every kind of fraud, but for fraud as to matters
'vital' to the marriage relationship only." (citations omitted).
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lated to sexual activity and reproduction.66Thus, for example, if an indi-
vidual falsely represents that he is capable of or interested in having
children, an annulment on the basis of fraud would be possible.
A voidable marriage, e.g., one that allegedly was celebrated because
of the fraudulent behavior of one of the parties, can be annulled by a
68
court, assuming that the relevant facts can be established. However,
such a marriage is valid until it is annulled .69 After all, it may be that the
defrauded individual forgave his or her spouse for the initial deception
and wanted to remain married-indeed, the "victima' may have ratified
the marriage by continuing to cohabit with the other party once the
fraud had come to light.7 In any event, the general rule is that a mar-
riage cannot be annulled on the basis of fraud once the marriage is no
longer in existence because one of the parties had died.7"
66. See Kerry' Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L.
Ray. 1625, 1680 (2007) ("Most state courts have restricted annulment for fraud to
cases involving misrepresentations that go to the 'essentials' of the marriage, defined
as the capacity or willingness to procreate or have sexual intercourse.").
67. See, e.g., Rich v. Rich, 337 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (App. Div. 1972) "[P]laintiff properly
and adequately established that defendant before the marriage falsely represented to
her that he intended to have children; that defendant then knew such representations
to be false and fraudulent; that plaintiff believed defendant's representations, married
him in reliance thereon and would not have married him if she knew he did not in-
tend to have children; anid that when defendant's true intentions surfaced, she no
longer cohabited with him and thus did not cohabit with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud. Under the circumstances, annulment should have been
granted."
68. Skagen v. New York City Emp. Ret. Sys., 437 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (1981) ("When a
marriage has been procured by fraud, it is merely voidable, subject to appropriate ac-
tion by the defrauded party.").
69. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 S.W.3d 100, 105 (Ky. 2006) ("And a voidable
marriage is valid and binding upon the parties until such time as it is annulled by a
competent court.") (citing Brewer v. Miller, 673 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tenn. App.
1984)).
70. See, e.g., Wirth v. Wirth, 23 N.Y.S.2d 289, 292 (1940). [T~he plaintiff lived with the
defendant as his wife for over four months after he received the January, 1937, report
of the detective agency and is estopped from claiming any fraud on the part of the de-
fendant because by living with her after knowing the contents of the reports he
ratified the marriage.
71. See Gibbons v. Blair, 376 N.W.2d 22, 25 (N.D. 1985) ("Applying the majority rule
and rationale to the facts of this case, we hold that an action to annul a marriage on
the ground of fraud can only be brought by the defrauded spouse while both parties
to the marriage are living."); Andrade v. Jackson, 401 A.2d 990, 994 (D.C. 1979)
("The significance of whether decedent's marriage to appellee was void Ab initio or
merely voidable is that a marriage void Ab initio is subject to collateral attack at any
time whereas a marriage merely voidable cannot be annulled after the death of either
spouse.") (citing Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 226 (1934)).
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A claim that someone had been fraudulently induced to marry re-
quires both that the defrauded party had not known, and that the other
party had known the relevant information. Thus, in a case in which an
individual only discovers that he or she is transgendered after the mar-
riage has already been celebrated, the requisite knowledge would not
have been present before the marriage, and thus that person would not
have been guilty of having foisted a fraud upon his or her marital part-
ner. 72 Such a marriage might be dissolved, for example, because of
irreconcilable differences,"3 but that would be different from holding
that the marriage had never existed .7
In some cases, federal courts have attempted to determine whether
a state would recognize the marriage between a post-operative transsex-
ual and her spouse. For example, at issue in In re Lovo-Lara 7 ' was
whether North Carolina would recognize a marriage between a resident
72. See, eg, Morin v. Morin, No. 2006-418, 2007 WL 5313306, at *2 (Vt. May, 2007).
In considering defendant's request for annulment pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 516, the
court noted that the parties' testimony differed regarding whether defendant was
aware of plaintiffs transgender identity at the time of their marriage. The court
found credibility determinations to be difficult in light of the dramatically conflicting
testimony. Ultimately, the court concluded that defendant had failed to meet the
high standard for proving fraud.
73. See, e.g., CAL,. Fbi,. CODE § 23 10 (West 2009) ("Dissolution of the marriage or legal
separation of the parties may be based on ... [ilrreconcilable differences, which have
caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage."); IDAHO CODE § 32-603 ("Di-
vorces may be granted for any of the following causes: . .. 8. Irreconcilable
differences."); N.D. CENT. CODE 14-05-03 (2010) ("Divorces may be granted for
any of the following causes: . . . 7. Irreconcilable differences."); N.H. Ray. STAT.
ANN. § 458:7-a (2010) ("A divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be decreed, ir-
respective of the fault of either party, on the ground of irreconcilable differences
which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage.").
74. See Commonwealth ex re. Knode v. Knode, 27 A.2d 536, 538 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1942);
A decree of annulment in reality does not annul the marriage, for it does
not speak only from its date; it merely declares that the marriage was void
from the very beginning. It does not create a new status, but, on the con-
trary, affirms that there has been no change in status. A nullity in law is not
comparative, to be measured by degrees; it is absolute, implying that the
thing has no legal existence. Such decree is no more than a declaratory
judgment, judicially determining with certainty and finality that there
never was a valid marriage.
see aLso, Skagen v. New York City Emp. Ret. Sys., 437 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498 (1981)
("O0nce annulled by the court for fraud, however, that marriage is deemed erased as if
it never took place. In that respect it is vety much unlike a divorce, which serves to
legally terminate a marriage deemed to have validly existed.") (citing Sleicher v. Slei-
cher, 167 N.E. 501 (N.Y. 1929)).
75. In re Lovo-Lara, 23 1. & N. Dec. 746 (2005).
ol. 17:5770
of North Carolina and a citizen of El Salvador.716 The court noted that
the petitioner, Gia Teresa Lovo-Ciccone, had been born male,' but had
undergone sex reassignment surgery 78 and received a new birth certificate
designating her sex as female .7 ' Further, the state of North Carolina had
registered her marriage, listing her as the bride.80 The Lovo-Lara court
found that the marriage was valid under North Carolina law and thus
that the visa should be issued."' Indeed, the Lovo-Lara court suggested
that for immigration purposes, an individual's gender should be deter-
mined "based on the designation appearing on the current birth
certificate issued to that person by the State in which he or she was
born." 8
2
While the Lovo-Lara approach of using the current birth certificate
has much to commend it as a matter of public policy, Littleton and
Gardiner suggest that such a policy may not be the best way to
capture whether a state would in fact recognize a marriage between a
post-operative transsexual and someone of that person's birth sex, sex
reassignment surgery and amended birth certificate in hand notwith-
standing."3 Lovo-Lara might be contrasted with In re Oren,"' where Jack
Keegan sought a visa for his wife, Ady Oren. Jack Keegan, n&e Jessica
Wilson, had undergone sex reassignment surgery and had been issued a
new birth certificate in accord with Michigan law. He had married his
spouse in Oregon. Notwithstanding that both Michigan and Oregon
authorize birth certificate modifications after appropriate surgical proce-
dures have been performed, the Oren court refused to take a position on
whether Oregon would recognize the marriage, remanding the case for
further consideration.
76. Lovo-Lara, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 746. By the same token, the question before the court
in In re Widener, File A95 347 686, 2004 WL 2375065 (B.I.A. Sept. 21, 2004), was
whether South Carolina would recognize a marriage between Jacob Widener and
Esperanza Martinez Widener, who had been born male in the Philippines. Esperanza
had undergone sex reassignment surgery and had a Philippine birth certificate reflect-
ing her change of sex.
77. See Lovo-Lara, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 746-47.
78. See Lovo-Lara, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 748 ("the documents submitted by the petitioner
reflect that she underwent sex reassignment surgery").
79. See Lovo-Lara, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 748.
80. See Lovo-Lara, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 748.
81. See Lovo-Lara, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 753.
82. Lovo-Lara, 23 1. & N. Dec. at 753.
83. See Katrina C. Rose, Is the Renaissance Still Alive in Michigan? Or Just Extrinsic?
Transsexuals' Rights After National Pride at Work, 35 OHio N.U. L. REv. 107, 120
(2009) (noting that many courts have not accepted the sex designation on an
amended birth certificate for marriage purposes).
84. In re Oren, File: A79 761 848, 2004 WL 1167318 (B.I.A. Jan. 21, 2004).
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Oren is the kind of decision that might give Thomas Beatie and his
family pause. Jack Keegan had met the requirements for a birth certifi-
cate modification in Michigan, just as Thomas Beatie had the necessary
surgery to qualifyr for a change of sex designation on his birth certificate
in Hawaii." Keegan and his wife had married in Oregon, while Beatie
and his wife, Nancy, had married in Hawaii .8  Neither Michigan nor
Hawaii required genital surgery in order for the birth certificate to be
modified."7
At issue in Oren was whether the Oregon marriage was valid, which
depended upon whether Oregon would treat Keegan as male or female
for marriage purposes. It should be noted that the fact that Keegan had
an amended birth certificate and the fact that Keegan and Oren had an
Oregon marriage license was not enough to convince the court that the
marriage would be considered valid in Oregon. The claim here is not
that Keegan's marriage would or should be considered invalid in Ore-
gon, just as the claim here is not that Beatie's marriage would or should
be considered invalid in Oregon. The point is merely that it is still an
open question whether Oregon will recognize a marriage between a
transgendered individual and that person's partner, even when a birth
certificate has been modified in accord with local law and even when the
parties have already secured a marriage license.
Perhaps the issue simply will not arise for the Beaties or, perhaps,
the Oregon Legislature will make clear via statute the conditions under
which the transgendered can marry their loved ones."8 That said, it is
important to understand that a state's refusal to recognize the validity of
a marriage can have a variety of implications. For example, as Littleton
demonstrates, an individual might be precluded from bringing a wrong-
ful death action if that individual is viewed as a legal stranger to, and
not the legal spouse of the deceased." So, too, Gardiner demonstrates
85. See Thomas Beatie. Labor of Love: The Story of One Man's Extraordinary Pregnancy
160 (Seal Press 2008).
86. See Beatie supra note 85, at 178. But see Goodman, supra note 4, at A17 ("Thomas
married Nancy in Oregon").
87. See Oren, 2004 WL 1167318, at *2 ("The petitioner has had a bilateral mastectomy,
but not genital surgery."); Beatie, supra note 85. at 161-62.
88. The Oregon Legislature has specified by statute that birth certificates can be amended
because of surgical intervention. See OR. REv. STAT. § 432.235(4) (2009) (Effective
Jan. 1, 2008); see also In re Taylor, No. 03CA1753, 2003 WL 22382512, at *5 (D.C.
Super. Ct. March 17, 2003) ("The legislature did respond to the issue, and Oregon
now has a statutory provision that enables a person whose sex has been changed by
surgical procedure to amend his or her birth certificate.").
89. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W-3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) ("As a male, Christie
cannot be married to another male. Her marriage to Jonathan was invalid, and she
cannot bring a cause of action as his surviving spouse.")
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that an individual might be viewed as a legal stranger to her deceased-
albeit not legally recognized-husband and so be denied any portion of
the estate should the deceased have died intestate."0 In both of these
cases, the marriage had continued undisturbed until one of the parties
had died, and someone else had challenged the validity of the marriage.
Because the claim in both Littleton and Gardiner was that the marriage
was void rather than merely voidable,"1 the marriage was still subject to
attack notwithstanding that one of the parties to the marriage had
died .'
C Dissolutions ofMarriages Where One of the Parties
Is Transgendered
A few cases have involved marriage dissolutions where the person
seeking the dissolution had knowingly married a post-operative trans-
sexual. Kantaras v. Kantaras3 involved a challenge to the 94marriage
between Michael, n~e Margo, Kantaras and Linda Kantaras.' Michael
had undergone sex reassignment surgery before meeting Linda,"and
96
Linda had been informed about Michael's surgeries.
Linda and Michael married one month after she had given birth to
a child fathered by a former boyfriend.' A few months later, he applied
to adopt Linda's child . 8 Three years later, Linda gave birth to a girl after
having undergone artificial insemination with the sperm of Michael's
brother."9
Nine years after they had married, Michael filed for divorce, seek-
ing custody of both children.1 00 In her answer, Linda claimed that the
90. See In re Est. of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 123 (Kan. 2002) ("Marshall died intestate
... Joe alleg[ed] that he was the sole heir in that the marriage between J'Noel and
Marshall was void since J'Noel was born a man.").
91. See notes 64-7 1 and accompanying text supra (discussing voidable marriages).
92. Arnelle v. Fisher, 647 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) ("Although the
invalidity of a void marriage may be asserted in either a direct or collateral proceeding
and at any time, either before or after the death of the husband, the wife, or both, a
voidable marriage is good for every purpose and can only be attacked in a direct pro-
ceeding during the life of the parties.") (citing Kuehmsred v. Turnwall, 138 So. 775,
777 (Fla. 1932)).
93. 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
94. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 155.
95. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 155.
96. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 155.
97. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 155-56.
98. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 156.
99. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 156.
100. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 156.
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marriage was void because it involved individuals of the same sex, that
the adoption of her son was void because Florida precludes adoptions by
gays, and that Michael was neither the biological nor the legal father of
their daughter.' 1
The trial court found that Michael was male'02 and therefore up-
held the validity of the marriage.' The appellate court reversed,
reasoning that "whether a postoperative transsexual is authorized to
marry a member of their birth sex is a matter for the Florida legislature
and not the Florida courts to deie"O Because the legislature had not
spoken to this issue one way or the other, the appellate court held that
any marriage "not between persons of the opposite sex determined by
their biological sex at birth . ..is void ab initio."'O' The court refused to
"undertake a determination of the legal status of the children resulting
from our conclusion that the marriage is void,"'06 leaving that for the
trial court.107 Fortunately, Michael and Linda were subsequently able to
negotiate a custody agreement."
just as the parent-child relationships continued in Kantaras not-
withstanding the court's finding the underlying marriage null and void,
a similar result occurred in Pierre v. Pierre.' Lauraleigh and Andrew
Pierre married in 1994 and divorced in 2002.10 The divorce judgment
reflected the couple's wishes regarding custody, visitation and support."
However, possibly because of the influence of third parties," 2 Andrew
was forced to seek enforcement of his custody and visitations rights the
following year."
While Andrew had an amended birth certificate stating that he was
male," 4 Lauraleigh argued that their marriage was null and void because
Andrew had been born a woman."' There was conflicting testimony
101. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 156.
102. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 156.
103. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 156.
104. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 161.
105. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 161.
106. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 161.
107. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 161.
108. See Rose, supra note 83, at 148.
109. 898 So.2d 419 (La Cr. App. 2004).
110. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 420.
111. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at42 1.
112. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 421 ("Pierre believed the sex change had become an issue since
their divorce because of the influence of ... [her] parents and her boyfriend, Dan
Marler, who was by that time living with her and the children.").
113. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 42 1.
114. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 423.
115. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 422.
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about whether Andrew had told Lauraleigh about his sex reassignment
surgery prior to their marriage. 116 In any event, she had understood that
he could not father a child.'"7 Indeed, because the children had been
born through artificial insemination and he had no biological tie to
them, she sought to have his parental rights and obligations termi-
nated."' 5
The trial court held that Lauraleigh was to have sole custody," 9 and
refulsed to find that Andrew even had parental rights.' The court none-
theless held that visitation with Andrew should continue because it was
in the best interests of the children.'12 ' The appellate court reversed the




While the decision had a good result in that Andrew was permitted
to continue his relationship with his children, his parental rights were by
no means rendered secure by this decision. The Pierre majority sug-
gested that a different court would have jurisdiction to terminate
Andrew's rights.12 1 If Lauraleighs new husband2 2' had wanted to adopt
the children via a stepparent adoption, 26it would not have been
116. See Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 42 1.
117. See Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 423. However, there was some dispute as to whether she
understood why he could not father a child. See Pierre at 422-23.
118. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 422.
119. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 423 ("In the legal situation, I would find that in fact these chil-
dren are [her] children and she is to have sole custody.").
120. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 423 ("1 don't think that we've reached the point now, in this
jurisdiction where the situation we have, . .. the facts that we have in this case, war-
rant Andrew having parental rights.").
121. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 423.
122. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 425 ("There are simply no provisions in our law under which a
district court has subject matter jurisdiction to terminate parental rights under these
circumstances.").
123. Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 426 ("[Me find no manifest error in the court's factual findings
and no abuse of discretion in its decision to allow [Andrew] continued visitation with
the children.").
124. See Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 424 ("[Voluntary or involuntary termination of parental
rights is a matter over which a court exercising juvenile jurisdiction has exclusive
original jurisdiction.").
125. See Pierre, 898 So. 2d at 421 n.2.
126. See LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. Art. 1243(A) (2009).
A stepparent, stepgrandparent, great-grandparent, grandparent, aunt, great aunt,
uncle, great uncle, sibling, or first, second, or third cousin may petition to adopt a
child if all of the following elements are met:
(1) The petitioner is related to the child by blood, adoption, or affinity
through a parent recognized as having parental rights.
(2) The petitioner is a single person over the age of eighteen or a married
person whose spouse is a joint petitioner.
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surprising for a new suit to have been brought to terminate Andrew's
rights. There was nothing in the Pierre decision to suggest that such a
suit would not be successful and, indeed, the Pierre dissent argued that
the trial court's award of visitation was reversible error.1
27
In re Marriage of Simmons' is a rather frightening case for trans-
gendered parents who worry about whether they would be able to
maintain their relationships with their children in the event that their
relationships with their adult partners were to end. Robert Simmons,
n&e Bessie Lewis, had the "outward appearance of a man, which includes
facial and body hair, male pattern baldness, a deep voice, a hypertro-
phied clitoris, and increased muscle and body mass."'12' He and Jennifer
had married, and seven years later Jennifer had given birth to a child
produced through artificial insemination.'3 '
Simmons had a new birth certificate, although it was issued nine
years after the marriage had taken place."3' Further, the surgery provid-
ing the basis for the new birth certificate did not occur until six years




Thirteen years into the marriage, Robert filed for divorce, seeking
custody of their child.' In her answer, Jennifer argued that their mar-
riage was void ab initio because it was a same-sex marriage, and that
Robert had no parental rights because he was neither the biological nor
the adoptive parent of the child.' The court agreed, holding that there
was no marriage and that Robert had no parental rights. However, lack
of parental rights notwithstanding, the court granted him visitation,"
an award that was not appealed.'
At trial, various doctors testified that there were other procedures to
be performed if Robert were to complete his sexual reassignment.3 Af-
ter considering this testimony, the trial court found that Robert was still
(3) The petitioner has had legal or physical custody of the child for at least
six months prior to filing the petition for adoption.
127. See Pierre, 898 So.2dat 428 (Kuhn, J., dissenting).
128. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. 2005).
129. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
130. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
131. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
132. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
133. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
134. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
135. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
136. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
137. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309 ("All of the physicians testified that there were other
surgeries which had to be done on petitioner before he could be considered com-
pletely sexually reassigned, which would include a vaginectomy, reduction
mamnmoplasty, metoidoiplasty, scrotoplasty, urethroplasty, and phalloplasty.").
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a woman, a judgment upheld on appeal. 3 8 Given the finding that
Robert was a woman, the trial court unsurprisingly found that the mar-
riage between Robert and Jennifer was a marriage between two
individuals of the same sex and thus was void under Illinois law.
139
There were numerous bases upon which the trial court might have
decided that the marriage between Robert and Jennifer was a marriage
between individuals of the same sex. Robert and Jennifer had married
before Robert had legally changed his name, before his birth certificate
had been amended, and even before he had had the surgery upon which
the authorization to amend his birth certificate was based. 40 Assuming
that same-sex marriage bans are not constitutionally infirm,' and that it
is both constitutional and good public policy to require the rransgen-
dered to undergo surgery before their birth certificates can be changed
to reflect their self-identified sex, 14 1 the court's decision was reasonable.
Further, Simmons might be read as not changing current law if it is un-
derstood to rest on the marriage as having been prematurely celebrated.
However, some of the dicta in Simmons would, if adopted, reverse some
of the legal gains that transgendered people have already made.
Robert had argued that "Illinois has officially acknowledged that he
was sexually reassigned when the State Registrar issued him a new birth
certificate designating his sex as 'male.'"" However, the court suggested
that "the mere issuance of a new birth certificate cannot, legally speak-
ing, make petitioner a male. 144 After all, it might be argued, the state
would not be committed to recognizing a change of sex designation
were that change based on fraud or a forgery.
138. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309.
139. See Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309.
140. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
141. But see Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & The Refinement of Substantive Due Proc-
ess, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y Ruv. 23, 55 (2005) ("the exclusion of same-sex couples from
marriage is unconstitutional").
142. But see Mark Strasser, Harvesting the Fruits of Gardiner: On Marriage, Public Policy,
and Fundamental Interests, 71 GEO. WASH. L. Rxv. 179, 229 (2003) ("a sex-
reassignment requirement would not be necessary if courts would exercise 'reasoned
judgment' to figure out whether an individual is irreversibly committed to his or her
identification with a particular sex") (footnote omitted). Further, not requiring sex
reassignment surgery might help transgendered individuals avoid medical complica-
tions. Teresa A. Zakaria, Note, By Any Other Name: Defining Male and Female in
Marriage Statutes, 3 AvE MAsu.& L. Ray. 349, 361 (2005) ("Marriage laws should not
promote SRS as a vehicle for altering legal sex for purposes of marriage because SRS
[sex reassignment surgery] can result in serious health problems.").
143. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309.
144. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 3 10.
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Yet, the court's refusal to recognize the effect of the new birth cer-
tificate might be read much more broadly than merely as rejecting that
the state is committed to recognizing fraudulently obtained records.
First, the court did not limit the conditions under which the new birth
certificate would be rejected as reflecting reality, e.g., by discussing
fraud, bribery or other ways in which the legitimacy of a document
might generally be understood to be undercut. Instead, the court sug-
gested that the "issuance of marriage licenses and new birth certificates
are ministerial acts that generally do not involve fact-finding,"' and
that courts do fact-finding. 46But this suggests that courts might as a
general matter second-guess the accuracy of records. Second, the court
did not qualify its statement by saying that the new birth certificate did
not make the petitioner male for purposes of marriage4 4' but, instead, left
open the possibility that a new birth certificate would not suffice to es-
tablish a change of sex for any purpose."
Robert was not only seeking to establish the validity of his mar-
riage-he was also seeking to assure the recognition of his parental
rights. He offered various possible bases upon which his parentage
might be established, noting, for example, that "a child born from artifi-
cial insemination to two married parents retains his right to parentage
with both parents even if the marriage is subsequently held invalid."4 9
However, the court reasoned that the statute was inapplicable to
Robert.50 Indeed, the court also rejected Robert's contention that he was
145. See Simmons cf Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) (describing
the "trial court's role in considering the petition [to amend an original birth certifi-
cate] was a ministerial one ... [which] involved no fact-finding or consideration of
the deeper public policy concerns presented").
146. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 310 ("The courts, on the other hand, are fact-finding bod-
ies. ").
147. Cf Katie D. Fletcher, In Re Marriage of Simmons: A Case for Transsexual Marriage
Recognition, 37 Loy. U. CHi. L.. 533, 566 (2006) (discussing Simmons and arguing
that the case suggests that "[ajbsent a statute or enforcement of an existing statute
clearly allowing a transsexual's reassigned sex and/or court decisions recognizing a
transsexual's reassigned sex, transsexual marriage rights with respect to their identified
sex will continue to be nonexistent").
148. See Rose, supra note 83, at 121 n.79 ("[The court also utilized language that, un-
doubtedly, anti-transsexual forces will cite to denigrate all meaning to all birth
certificates issued even to post-op transsexuals pursuant to the Illinois transsexual
birth certificate statute").
149. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 311.
150. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 312. While we agree with petitioner's interpretation of the
statute, we must conclude that it does not apply to him. That section, which confers
a presumption on a "man" to be the natural father of a child even after a marriage has
been declared invalid, is based on the premise that the parties who are involved are a
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a de facto parent,'"' and even that Jennifer could or should be estopped
from challenging his parentage.11
2
The Simmons court noted that the portion of the order granting
him visitation rights had not been appealed."' However, the court sug-
gested that the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
"superseded and supplanted the common law of visitation in Illinois and
that therefore any standing for visitation must be found solely within
that Act," 1 thereby suggesting that some transgendered parents may
have difficulty in assuring continued visitation with the children that
they have been helping to raise should this issue come before a court.
Thus, although Simmons did not hold that Robert's visitation rights
should be denied, one might read between the lines to see that those
rights might well have been denied had that issue been raised on appeal.
A transgendered parent having no biological connection to the child
whom he or she is helping to raise might well consider adopting that
child if such an option is available, especially if the family might be
crossing state lines in the future.'
man and a woman. As we have previously determined, petitioner is not a man within
the meaning of the statute, and that, therefore, the statute does not apply.
15 1. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 312-13.
152. Compare Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 313, with Karin T. v. Michael T., 484 N.Y.S.2d
780, 784 (Fain. Ct. 1985).
We, of course, are not here dealing with a separation agreement. But cer-
tainly the document which was signed by the respondent and by which
these children were brought into the world gives rise to a situation which
must provide these two children with remedies. To hold otherwise would
allow this respondent to completely abrogate her responsibilities for the
support of the children involved and would allow her to benefit from her
own fraudulent acts which induced their birth no more so than if she were
indeed the natural father of these children. Of course, the respondent was
free to engage and live in any lifestyle which she felt appropriate. However,
by her course of conduct in this case which brought into the world two in-
nocent children she should not be allowed to benefit from those acts to the
detriment of these children and of the public generally . . .. The contract
and the equitable estoppel which prevail in this case prevent the respon-
dent from asserting her lack of responsibility by reason of lack of
parenthood. This Court finds that under the unique facts in this case, re-
spondent is indeed a "parent" to whom such responsibility attaches.
153. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 307.
154. Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 313 (citing In re Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316,
320 (1999)).
155. Cf Mark Strasser, When Is a Parent Not a Parent? On DOMA Civil Unions, and
Presumptions of Parenthood, 23 C.&iR'ozo L. Ray. 299, 315-16 (200 1) (suggesting
that an individual helping to raise a same-sex partner's child might be well-advised to
adopt that child, especially if the family might be changing domiciles in the future).
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D. On Custody and Visitation
The difficulty raised in Simmons for transgendered parents will only
arise under certain conditions. For example, suppose that a state recog-
nizes de facto or psychological parenthood. In that event, even if the
marriage were held to be void and of no legal effect, the (not-legally-
recognized) partner might still be granted custody of or visitation with
the child whom he or she had been helping to raise, even if that adult
did not have a biological or adoptive relationship with that child. 156
If the adults' relationship ends and the transgendered parent is
related by blood or adoption to the child, then the issue will be how
custody and visitation rights and responsibilities should be allocated-
the transgendered parent will be treated as any other parent whose
custodial and visitation rights must be determined. Basically, the distri-
bution of those rights and obligations will depend upon what
arrangement would best promote the interests of the child. Best interests
will be used to determine who should have custody,117 as well as whether
any restrictions should be placed upon visitation rights.' That said,
156. Compare Leonard v. Boardman, 854 A.2d 869, 872 n.4 (Me. 2004) ("A court may
award parental rights and responsibilities of a child to a de facto parent") (citing
Young v. Young, 845 A.2d 1144, 1145 (Me. 2004)), with Janice M. v. Margaret K.,
948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008) ("We will not recognize de facto parent status, as set
forth in S.F, as a legal status in Maryland. We refuse to do so because, even assuming
arguendo that we were to recognize such a status, short-circuiting the requirement to
show unfitness or exceptional circumstances is contrary to Maryland jurisprudence.")
(citing S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9 (Md. App. 2000)).
157. See, e.g, Magnuson v. Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 67-68 (Wash. App. 2007):
In sum, the need of each child, not Robbie's transgender status, was the
court's focus in determining residential placement. The court focused on
the children's need for "environmental and parental stability" in granting
the majority of residential time to Tracy, a permissible statutory factor ad-
dressing the children's emotional needs. RCW 26.09.187(3)(a) M. v. M..
Nos. FA 940064700, FA 890050074, 1996 WL 434302, at *7 (Conn. Su-
per. July 11, 1996);
Based upon the information in the evaluation, the children's expressed
wishes, and the change in circumstances, Mr. Williams now recommends
that the children reside primarily with their biological father, now Mrs.
O'N. The girls' father had a gender change operation in 1990 and was
married as a female in 1994.
In re Custody of T.J., No. C2-87-1786, 1988 WL 8302, at *3 (Minn. App. Feb. 9,
1988) (affirming custodial award to transgendered father because there was "no evi-
dence which would lead the Court to believe that providing primary parenting
responsibilities to a gender dysphoric father would cause future problems for T.J.").
158. Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 667 (Md. 1998). We seek to clarifyr that only one
standard is used in determining whether to restrict parental visitation in the presence
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however, the best interests analysis might include, for example, adjust-
ment difficulties that the children might have if the parent transitions,
which might even result in the parent's losing rights of visitation in ex-
159treme cases.
CONCLUSION
Current law in many states is indeterminate with respect to
whether or under what conditions a transsexual can marry someone of
his or her birth sex. This is not simply a matter of determining the con-
ditions under which a modification to a birth certificate will be
permitted, because in some states an individual can be of one sex for
certain purposes and a different sex for other purposes. Matters become
even more complicated when families travel through or move to other
of non-ma-rital partners, bests [sic] interests of the child, but we also want to empha-
size that when a court is engaging in a best interests analysis, reasonable maximum
exposure to each parent is presumed to be in the best interests of the child.
159. See Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 58 (Nev. 1986), overruled on other grounds bylIn re
Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 8 P.3d 126, 132 (Nev. 2000), NRS
128.107 provides that the child's desires regarding the termination should be a spe-
cific consideration, if the child has sufficient capacity to express his or her desires.
Considering Mary's age and intelligence, the lower court found her to have the requi-
site capacity. We agree with the court's finding. In the present case, Mary told Dr.
Weiheir and the trial judge that she did not want to see her father. Mary also said it
would be disturbing to visit with her father and made it graphically clear that she
didn't want to see him again. Cf M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31, 36 (Ky. Ct. App.
2007) ("Although one professional opined that the entire family mishandled inform-
ing and supporting M.B., we cannot say that the circuit court erred in holding the
appellant primarily responsible for [daughter] M.B.'s emotional injury."); but cf
Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132, 134 (Colo. App. 1973),
In the meantime, given the circumstances concerning Mary's view of Suzanne
and the extent of her opposition to further ties with a vestigial parent, it can be said
that Suzanne, in a very real sense, has terminated her own parental rights as a father.
It was strictly Tim Daly's choice to discard his fatherhood and assume the role of a
female who could never be either mother or sister to his daughter. The evidence
shows that, subsequent to the 1964 divorce, the respondent has been going through a
transsexual change from female to male, that the respondent's name was legally
changed from Gay Christensen Christian to Mark Avle Randall, and that subsequent
to the filing of the petition respondent married a woman. 1971 Perm.Supp.,
C.R.S.1963, 46-1-24(2), specifically directs that, in determining best interests, 'The
court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his rela-
tionship with the child.' (emphasis supplied) The record discloses that the above
circumstances did not adversely affect respondent's relationship with the children nor
impair their emotional development. Christian, 516 P.2d at 135 ("The judgment of
the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter an order
denying the petition for modification of custody.").
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states with differing rules regarding marriage or birth certificate modifi-
cations.
Thomas Beatie made headlines as the first man to give birth to a
child. But many transgendered individuals are parents, and the current
lack of clarity with respect to which families will be legally recognized
puts families at risk in ways that simply cannot be justified-courts can
hold spousal and parent-child relationships void and of no legal effect
years after the marriage was celebrated, thereby unsettling justified ex-
pectations and destroying relationships whose preservation would
benefit both children and adults. Either Congress or the states must act
to rectify the current situation by making policies which account for the
needs of the transgendered community and which assure that individu-
als will not be of one sex for certain purposes and of a different sex for
others, or be of one sex in one state but of a different sex when crossing
state lines. The current system imposes unjustifiable burdens on the
transgendered and their families and must be corrected at the earliest
opportunity.t
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